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Abstract
This paper investigates the nature of nonlinearities in the monetary policy rule
of the US Fed using the ﬂexible approach of Hamilton (2001a). We ﬁnd that while
there is signiﬁcant evidence of nonlinearity for the period to 1979, there is little such
evidence for the subsequent period. Possible asymmetries in the Fed’s reactions to
inﬂation deviations from target and the output gap in the 1960s and 70s may tell part
of the story, but do not capture the entire nature of the nonlinearity. The inclusion of
the interaction between inﬂation deviations and the output gap, as recently proposed,
appears to characterize the nonlinear policy rule more adequately.
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Since the early 1990s, research on monetary policy reaction functions has come with a
rush from academic institutes, central bankers and private ﬁnancial ﬁrms. In partic-
ular, the so-called Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) has received considerable attention, in
large part because this simple rule described the actual behaviour of the US Federal
Funds rate rather surprisingly well. According to this rule, the Federal Reserve (or
Fed, the US central bank) sets the Federal Funds interest rate using current values
of real output and inﬂation in relation to their target values. In a similar context,
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) examine a forward-looking monetary policy
reaction function in which the central bank proactively adjusts interest rates using
expected future gaps in inﬂation and output compared with target values. The the-
oretical basis of linear reaction functions of this type rests on two key assumptions,
namely that the central bank has a quadratic loss function and that the aggregate
supply relation (Phillips curve) is linear.1
Recently, however, both of these assumptions have been challenged. In relation
to the ﬁrst, Nobay and Peel (1998), Cukierman (2000), Gerlach (2000), Ruge-Murcia
(2001, 2002) and Bec, Salem and Collard (2002) consider asymmetric preference
speciﬁcations for the central bank. Cukierman (2000) suggests that the political es-
tablishment views the costs of recessions as greater than the beneﬁts of expansions.
In a democratic society, an independent, but accountable, central bank cannot be
totally insensitive to the wishes of the political establishment, so some of this asym-
metry will appear in the loss function of the central bank. Gerlach (2000) ﬁnds that
the Fed may have been more concerned by negative rather than by positive output
gaps in the pre-1980 period, while Bec, Salem, and Collard (2002) extend his model
1For more general study on monetary policy rule, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
2and conclude that the state of the business cycle (again measured by the output
gap) is important for monetary policy in post-1982 U.S., French and German data.
Instead of the output gap, Ruge-Murcia (2001, 2002) concentrates on asymmetric
preferences with respect to unemployment, ﬁnding evidence for nonlinear behaviour
of the central bank in OECD and G7 countries.
Turning to the second assumption, Schaling (1999) and Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Naveira (2002b) allow inﬂation to be a convex function of the output gap, im-
plying a nonlinear aggregate supply (Phillips) curve. Combined with a quadratic
loss function, the optimal policy rule is then also nonlinear, with the central bank
increasing interest rates by a larger amount when inﬂation is above target than the
amount it will reduce them when inﬂation is below target. Speciﬁcally, the reaction
function derived by Dolado et al. (2002b) includes an interaction between expected
inﬂation and the output gap. Empirical support for this interest rate rule is found
in France, Germany and Spain over the 1980s and 1990s, but not in the US.
Dolado, Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002a) construct a general model, allowing
the joint analysis of both types of departure from the linear-quadratic setup and in
principle permitting the source of nonlinearities in the nominal interest rate rule to be
traced back to central bank preferences, nonlinearities in the supply curve, or both.
Their results imply that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear
policy rule due to asymmetric inﬂation preferences of the Fed after 1983, but that
the rule was linear prior to 1979.
Although this recent literature has provided evidence in favour of nonlinear mone-
tary policy rules, all the empirical studies to date assume speciﬁc parametric models.
In reality, however, we do not directly observe either the central bank’s preferences
or the aggregate Phillips curve in the economy, so that there exists an unbounded
universe of possible alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations. Because rejection of linearity
3against a speciﬁc nonlinear alternative does not necessarily imply the validity of that
nonlinear model, we believe that it is important to investigate the nature of any non-
linearities in the central bank’s reaction function while avoiding speciﬁc parametric
assumptions. To this end, the present paper applies the methodology recently devel-
oped by Hamilton (2001a) to address this question. This approach provides a valid
test of the null hypothesis of linearity against a broad range of alternative nonlinear
models, consistent estimation of what the nonlinear relation looks like, and formal
comparison of alternative nonlinear models. Hamilton (2001b), and Hamilton and
Kim (2002) show that this methodology is very useful for characterizing the nonlin-
ear relation between oil price changes and GDP growth and nonlinearity in the term
structure, respectively.
Following Clarida et. al. (2000) and others, we consider the monetary policy
reaction function for the postwar UnitedS t a t e se c o n o m y ,b o t ha sas i n g l es a m p l e
and as subsamples before and after Volcker’s appointment as the Fed Chairman
in 1979. While we ﬁnd no evidence of nonlinearity in post-1960 U.S. monetary
policy using the whole period, the two subsamples show diﬀerent results. More
speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd relatively strong evidence of nonlinearity for the pre-Volcker era,
but little such evidence in the Volcker-Greenspan era. Our results are robust to
whether the monetary policy rule is forward- or backward-looking and to diﬀerent
measures of both the output gap and inﬂation forecasts. We also explicitly test
whether parametric representations previously suggested for the monetary policy
rule capture all nonlinearity. Although we ﬁnd some support for the hypothesis that
the Fed reacted in an asymmetric way to the output gap in the 1960s and 70s, as
suggested by Gerlach (2000), this type of asymmetric behaviour does not fully capture
the nonlinearity. However, the speciﬁcation in which the Fed reacts to the interaction
between inﬂation and the output gap, as proposed in Dolado et al. (2002b), does
4adequately characterize the nonlinear policy rule during this period.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews speciﬁcations for non-linear
monetary policy rules suggested in the literature to date and proposes a ﬂexible
version of a nonlinear monetary policy rule. Section 3 reviews the Hamilton (2001a)
methodology applied in this paper. Empirical results, including evaluation of speciﬁc
nonlinear formulations, are in Section 4. Conclusions are oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Nonlinear monetary policy rules
As noted in the Introduction, the linear monetary policy rules used by many authors
are based on the assumption that the central bank has a quadratic loss function
and the aggregate supply relation (Phillips curve) is linear2. These linear rules do
quite well in describing monetary policy as implemented in many countries, including
that of the Fed in the US. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of these rules and the grounds on which they have recently been
challenged.
As usual, we assume that monetary policy is conducted by a central bank that
chooses the sequence of short-term interest rates in order to minimize the present
discounted value of its loss function which depends on both inﬂation and output in







δτL(e πt+τ, e yt+τ), (2.1)
2Examples of the empirical application of these linear rules include Taylor (1993, 1999), Clarida
et. al. (1998, 2000), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000).
5such that
πt+1 = πt + f(e yt)+ut+1, (2.2)
e yt+1 = ee yt + g(rt)+ηt+1, (2.3)
where δ is the discount factor, L(.) is the unrestricted general loss function of the
central banker, f(.) and g(.) are possibly nonlinear functions, πt is the inﬂation rate at
time t, it is the nominal interest rate, e πt+τ is the expected inﬂation deviation from the
inﬂation target (π∗)a tt i m et+τ, e yt is the output gap, rt = it−πt is the real interest
rate, and ut+1, and ηt+1 are shocks. Equations (2.2) and (2.3) describe the supply
side (i.e., Phillips curve) and the aggregate demand of the economy respectively. As
general AS and AD relations, we assume that
∂f
∂e yt > 0,0 ≤ e<1, and
∂g
∂rt < 0. This
is a generalization of the setup of Svensson (1997) that is the basis of many of the
studies discussed below. The speciﬁc policy rule of a central bank depends on the
functional forms of L(.),f (.),and g(.), with the linear rule being a special case.
Cukierman (2000) speciﬁes the loss function as L(.)=1 /2
£
π2 + Ae y2¤
if e y<0
and L(.)=1
2π2 otherwise, to capture the central bank’s aversion to recessions. This
loss function implies that the central banker dislikes inﬂa t i o na sw e l la sn e g a t i v e
output gaps, but given inﬂation the central banker is indiﬀerent to positive output
gaps. Bec et al. (2002) generalize this possible dependence on the state of the



















3For the application of regime switching techniques to the measurement of monetary policy
regimes, see Owyang and Ramey (2001).
6where ωe and ωr are positive relative weights to output stabilization in expansion
(e) and recession (r) respectively, p is the lag, and δ[.] is the Heaviside or indicator
function which is unity when the condition [.] holds, and zero otherwise. Based on
(2.4) and linear dynamics in the AS/AD model, the central bank’s optimal reaction
function is state contingent and takes the following threshold type speciﬁcation:
it = {
α + ρ(L)it−1 + βeEte πt+k + γeEte yt+q + εt, if e yt−p > 0
α + ρ(L)it−1 + βrEte πt+k + γrEte yt+q + εt, if e yt−p ≤ 0.
(2.5)
Rejection of the null hypotheses, H0 : βe = βr,γe = γr indicates asymmetric re-
sponses to the inﬂation and/or output gaps across the two states of the business
cycle.
The studies Dolado et al. (2002a), (2002b) allow the Phillips curve (2.2) to be
convex in the inﬂation-output gap through the use of the functional form f(e yt)=
ae yt
1−aφe yt,f0 > 0,f 00 > 0,a>0 and φ ≥ 0.4 Following Schaling (1999), Dolado et al.
(2002b) also impose this form of nonlinearity in the output gap on the loss function
through the speciﬁcation of (2.1) as L(.)=1
2(e πt+k)2 + s
2f(e yt+q)2, where s measures
t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fs t a b i l i z i ng the output gap. The implication of f(.) is
that the central bank is more averse to positive output gaps than negative ones, so
that interest rate increases are used aggressively to avoid the economy overheating.
Minimising this loss function given the form of the Phillips curve leads to a nonlinear
Euler equation, which (through a ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion) results in the
policy rule:
it = c + ρ(L)it−1 + βe πt+1 + γe yt + b(e πt+1e yt)+εt. (2.6)
Note the inclusion of the multiplicative term in the inﬂation and output gaps, so that
4Dolado et. al. (2002b) introduce f(.) in the loss function, rather than the quadratic term e y
2
t, to
enable them to derive a tractable closed-form solution for the optimal policy rule. See the Appendix
of their paper.
7rejection of the null H0 : b =0provides evidence on this nonlinearity.
In Dolado et al. (2002a), the authors adopt the linex function in inﬂation de-
viations as the loss function, namely L(πt − π∗)=
exp(θ(πt−π∗))−θ(πt−π∗)−1
θ2 , where
θ is a nonzero parameter5. As they discuss, this function permits diﬀerent weights
for positive and negative deviations of inﬂation from π∗, it implies that the size as
well as the sign of a deviation are important, and it relaxes certainty equivalence.
Hence, the central banker is allowed to exhibit a prudence motive and higher order
moments of the inﬂation deviation (in addition to the mean) may play a role in the
formulation of monetary policy. With these speciﬁc functional form assumptions for
(2.1) and (2.2), combined with a linear form for (2.3), they derive the general form
for the class of monetary policy rules they consider as:
it = πt + f(e yt)+γe yt +
(1/a)(πt − π∗ + θσ2
πt/2+f(e yt))




πt is the conditional variance of inﬂation. However, since linearity cannot be
rejected empirically for the AS curve using US data, their monetary rule imposes the
implied restriction φ =0in the estimated form of
it = c + ρ(L)it−1 +( 1− ρ)(βπt + γe yt + dσ2
πt)+εt. (2.8)
The time-varying conditional variance of inﬂation is parameterized using a GARCH(1,1)
model and (2.8) is then estimated by GMM. The eﬀect of inﬂation volatility is to
introduce prudence in the loss function of the Fed, with values above target being
weighted more heavily than those below.
Although each of the above speciﬁcations is plausible ap r i o r iand they may de-
5For analytical tractability, Dolado et al. (2002a) assume that the central bank’s loss function
excludes output stabilization. They show in their Appendix that with the inclusion of an output gap
term a closed-form solution cannot be obtained for the central bank’s problem.
8scribe certain properties of the nonlinear (asymmetric) relationship between interest
rates and inﬂation/output gap deviations from their targets, these policy rules are
driven by the speciﬁc assumptions made in each study about the central bank’s pref-
erences (the loss function) and/or the AS curve (Phillips curve). Perhaps surprisingly,
no research appears to have yet allowed for possible nonlinearity in the AD relation-
ship. While embedding nonlinearity in monetary policy rules in speciﬁc assumptions
about the central bank’s loss function or the AS/AD curves is logically attractive, it
is also important to take a broader view.
In reality, we do not directly observe the preferences of the central bank, so that
the assumption of a speciﬁc loss function might lead to incorrect inferences about the
nature of nonlinearities in the monetary policy rule. Indeed, there is an unbounded
universe of alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations of the policy rule depending on the
functional forms of the loss function, the Phillips curve and the aggregate demand
schedule. One logical way to avoid potential misspeciﬁcation problems would be to
leave the functions L(.),f (.), and g(.) in equations (2.1) - (2.3) unrestricted and allow
the data to tell us the form of the nonlinearity that is best supported by the data.
This paper pursues that idea by using a ﬂexible approach to nonlinear modeling
recently suggested by Hamilton (2001a). Thus, allowing general nonlinearities in
Fed’s response to inﬂation and the output gap, we conjecture only the following
ﬂexible monetary policy rule:
it = µ(Ete πt+k,E te yt+q)+γ(L)ii−1 + εt, (2.9)
where the function µ(.) is unrestricted, 1−γ(L) is a stationary polynomial in the lag
operator and εt is an error term. As discussed later, by applying Hamilton’s (2001)
methodology to infer the functional form of the monetary policy rule (2.9), we are
9able to evaluate each of the parametric rules discussed above. First, however, we
describe the technique in the next section.
3A ﬂexible approach to nonlinear inference
Hamilton (2001a) proposes a new framework that combines the advantages of non-
parametric and parametric methods. While the procedure does not assume any
speciﬁc functional form for the conditional mean function, parameters are used to
characterize this function and these parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood
or Bayesian methods. Inference is based on classical econometric theory.
Consider the general nonlinear regression model
yt = µ(xt)+γ0zt + εt, (3.1)
where yt is a scalar dependent variable, xt and zt are k-a n dp-dimensional vectors
of explanatory variables, and εt is an error term with mean zero that is independent
of xt and zt and of lagged values yt−j, xt−j, zt−j.(j =1 ,2,...). In (3.1) we allow
a subset of variables zt for which the research is willing to assume linearity, thereby
gaining eﬃciency by imposing this restriction. In our monetary policy application,
yt = it, xt =( Ete πt+1,E te yt+1)0, zt =( it−1,i t−2)0 for the forward-looking monetary
policy rule and xt =( πt, e yt)0, zt =( it−1,i t−2)0 for the backward-looking rule. In
contrast to previous analyses of nonlinear monetary policy rules, reviewed in the
previous section, we treat the form of function µ(·) as unknown. Following Hamilton
(2001a), we view this function as the outcome of a random ﬁeld. Speciﬁcally, the
value of the function µ(xt) at xt = τ is treated as being a Gaussian random variable
with mean equal to the linear component α0 + α
0
τ and variance λ2,w h e r eα0,α,
and λ are population parameters to be estimated. In the special case of λ =0 , then
10µ(xt) is ﬁxed and (3.1) becomes the usual linear regression model. In general, the
parameter λ measures the overall extent of nonlinearity.
The basic idea of the method is that nonlinearity implies the values for µ(xt) and
µ(xs) will be positively correlated for periods t and s whenever the vectors xt and
xs are close to each other. The key is then parameterizing this correlation based on
the distance measure hst =( 1 /2)
hPk
i=1 g2
i (xis − xit)2
i1/2
where xit denotes the ith
element of the vector xt and g1,g 2,...,g k are k additional parameters to be estimated.
Hamilton proposes that µ(xs) should be uncorrelated with µ(xt) if xs is suﬃciently
far away from xt.M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,
E{[µ(xs) − α0 − α
0
xs][µ(xt) − α0 − α
0
xt]} =0 if hst > 1 (3.2a)
However, when 0 ≤ hst ≤ 1, this correlation should increase as hst decreases, with the
correlation going to unity as hst goes to zero. In our context where the nonlinear part
of the model includes k =2explanatory variables, then the correlation is assumed
to be given by
Corr(µ(xs),µ(xt)) = H2(hst) if 0 ≤ hst ≤ 1 (3.2b)
where
H2(hst)=1− (2/π)[hst(1 − h2
st)1/2 +s i n −1(hst)]. (3.3)
For the general speciﬁcation and rationalization of this correlation, see Lemma 2.1
and Theorem 2.2 in Hamilton (2001a). It should be emphasized that Hk(.) does
not assume any parametric form for the functional relation µ(.) itself, but rather it
parameterizes the correlation between pairs of random outcomes µ(xs) and µ(xt).
The coeﬃcient gi determines the extent to which variation in the i-th element of xt
contributes to nonlinear variation in µ(xt). For gi small, the value of µ(xt) changes
11little when the value of the corresponding explanatory changes, with gi =0implying
linearity of µ(xt) with respect to that variable.
Prior to estimation it is appropriate to determine whether nonlinearity exists
by testing H0 : λ2 =0 . As is usual in nonlinear modelling, certain parameters
are unidentiﬁed under the null of linearity. In the present context, this applies to
g1,g 2,...,g k. For the purpose of the nonlinearity test, Hamilton suggests that the








thereby scaling in terms of the individual sample standard deviations and the number
of explanatory variables. Then, for T sample observations, the (T × T) matrix H of
correlations can be formed, with the row s,c o l u m nt element Hk{hst} given in (3.3)
when k =2and 0 ≤ hst ≤ 1, or zero when hst > 1. The Lagrange multiplier (LM)
test of the null hypothesis can be obtained by using the residuals from an OLS linear
regression of yt on (1,x0
t,z0
t)0. Denoting the OLS residual vector by b ε and the OLS
squared standard error as e σ2 =( T − k − p − 1)−1b ε
0
b ε,a n dt h e(T × T) projection
matrix M = IT −X(X0X)−1X0 where X is a (T ×(1+k +p)) matrix whose tth row
is given by (1,x0
t,z0
t) and IT is the (T × T) identity matrix, the test statistic is
ν2 =
[b ε
0Hb ε − e σ2tr(MHM)]2
e σ4(2tr{[MHM − (T − k − p − 1)−1Mtr(MHM)]2})
. (3.4)
Under the linearity null hypothesis, ν2 has an asymptotic χ2(1) distribution. Dahl’s
(2002) Monte Carlo investigations suggest that this test has good size and power
properties against a variety of nonlinear alternatives.
In the presence of nonlinearity, Hamilton writes (3.1) as
yt = α0 + α
0
xt + γ0zt + λm(xt)+εt (3.5)
= α0 + α
0
xt + γ0zt + ut,
12where m(.) is the realization of a scalar-valued Gaussian random ﬁeld with mean zero,
unit variance and covariance function given by (3.2a) and (3.2b). Assuming that the
regression disturbance εt is i.i.d. N(0,σ2), the composite disturbance ut = λm(xt)+
εt is also Gaussian. With independence between (x0
t,z0
t)0 and εt, this speciﬁcation
implies a GLS regression model of the form
y|X ∼ N(Xβ,P0 + σ2IT)
where y =( y1,y 2,...,y T)
0
, β is the (1+k+p)-dimensional vector (α0,α0,γ0)0, and P0
is a (T ×T) matrix whose row s,c o l u m nt element is given by λ2Hk(hst)δ[hst<1] with
hst is deﬁned above, and the function Hk(.) is speciﬁed in (3.3) for the case k =2 .
In addition to the linear regression parameters (α0,α,γ) and σ2, parameters to
be estimated are the variance of the nonlinear regression error, λ2, which governs the
overall importance of the nonlinear component, and the parameters (g1,g 2,...,g k)
determining the variability of the nonlinear component with respect to each explana-
tory variable in xt. As the above discussion implies, estimation and inference can be
achieved by a GLS Gaussian regression. However, Hamilton (2001a) also describes
the use of numerical Bayesian methods for the evaluation of the posterior distribu-
tion of any statistics of interest. The optimal inference of the value of the unobserved
function µ(x∗) at an arbitrary point x∗ is given by
b µ(x∗)=α0 + α0x∗ + q0(P0 + σ2IT)−1(y − Xβ), (3.6)
where the (T×1) vector q has tth element λ2Hk(h∗
t)δ[h∗
t<1] for h∗
t =( 1 /2)
hPk
i=1 g2




in which xit denotes the ith element of xt and x∗
i denotes the ith element of x∗.H a m i l -
ton shows that b µ(x∗) converges to the true value µ(x∗) for any µ(.) from a broad
class of continuous functions. This permits the calculation of conﬁdence intervals,
13using (3.6) along with its known standard error for each given parameter vector in
conjunction with values of α0,α,γ,σ,λ,and g =(g1,g 2,...,g k)0 generated from their
posterior distributions, and examining the resulting distribution of inferences.
From a Monte Carlo investigation, Dahl (2002) shows that in many situations
Hamilton’s random ﬁeld based estimator is substantially more accurate than the
non-parametric spline smoother. He also ﬁnds that the procedure is useful in ﬁnite
samples for characterizing a wide range of nonlinear time series models.
4 Empirical Results
Based on Hamilton’s (2001a) methodology described in the previous section, the
unrestricted monetary policy rule (2.9) can be rewritten as:
it = µ(xt)+α0
2zt + εt, (4.1)
µ(xt)=α0 + α0
1xt + λm(g ¯ xt), (4.2)
where xt =( Ete πt+k,E te yt+q)0 is 2 × 1 vector and ¯ denotes element by element
multiplication. The vector zt contains lagged interest rates which capture interest
rate smoothing by the Fed.6 Following the theoretical discussion of previous models
in Section 2, we assume that any nonlinearity in the Fed’s reaction function relates
only to the output gap and inﬂation, with lagged interest rates entering in a linear
way.
In this section we report estimates of the central bank reaction function described
by equations (4.1) and (4.2). We consider two diﬀerent policy rules; (1) a ﬂexible
nonlinear forward-looking rule in line with Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), (2) a ﬂexible
nonlinear backward-looking rule of the type used by Taylor (1993). Following Clarida
6For a discussion of the interest smoothing behaviour by the Fed, see Amato and Laubach (1999).
14et. al. (2000) and Dolado et al. (2002a), we investigate two monetary regimes in U.S.
economy, the pre-Volcker era (pre-1979) and the Volcker-Greenspan era (post-1979).
4.1 Data
Our data is quarterly from 1960:I to 2000:IV. Inﬂation is measured as the (annu-
alized) rate of change of the GDP deﬂator (Pt) between two subsequent quarters:
πt = 400 ∗ (ln(Pt) − ln(Pt−1)). The principal output gap measured we employ is the
diﬀerence between real GDP and the estimate for potential real GDP constructed
by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO). However, we also use output (real GDP)
detrended by the HP ﬁlter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The interest rate is the
average Federal Fund rate in the ﬁr s t - m o n t ho fe a c hq u a r t e r ,e x p r e s s e da ta n n u a l
rates. All these series were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
As a check on the robustness of the results of the forward-looking model to our
constructed inﬂation forecast values, we also use corresponding actual inﬂation fore-
casts, speciﬁcally the median value from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and
those of the Greenbook of the Federal Reserve Board7.T h e s ei n ﬂation forecast series
were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia website.
We divide the sample into two main subperiods. The ﬁrst (1960:I - 1979:II)
encompasses the tenures of William M. Martin, Arthur Burns, and G. William Miller
as Federal Reserve chairmen. The second (1979:III - 2000:IV) corresponds to the
terms of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan. Previous analyses, including Clarida et
al. (2000) and Dolado et al. (2002a), have indicated substantial diﬀerences in US
7The Survey of Professional Forecasters is the oldest quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasts
in the US. The survey began in 1968 and was conducted by the American Statistical Association and
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
taking it over in 1990. The Greenbook is produced before each meeting of the Federal Open Market
Committee containing projections by the Research staﬀ at the Board of Governors about how the
economy will fare in the future. These projections are made available to the public after a lag of ﬁve
years, and hence our Greenbook data ends in 1996:IV.
15interest rate policy over these subperiods.
4.2 Forward-looking rule
As a generalization of the model of Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), the ﬂexible nonlinear
forward-looking rule can be written as
it = c + αEte πt+k + βEte yt+q + γ1it−1 + γ2it−2
+σ[ζm(g1Ete πt+k,g 2Ete yt+q)+vt], (4.3)
where c,α,β,γ1,γ2,σ,ζ,g 1 and g2 are parameters to be estimated, vt ∼ N(0,1) and
m(.) denotes an unobserved realization from a Gaussian random ﬁe l dw i t hm e a nz e r o ,
unit variance, and correlations given by (3.2a) and (3.2b). In comparison with (3.5),
the innovation εt is written here as σ times vt and the parameter λ is σ times ζ.
Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) use GMM to estimate the linear version of the equation
(4.3) by replacing expected inﬂation and the output gap with their realized values.
However, for our baseline estimation we generate Ete πt+k and Ete yt+q by estimating
the processes for inﬂation and the output gap. Although this “generated regressors”
approach could result in invalid inferences (Pagan, 1984), we guard against this to
the extent that is practical by checking robustness to actual inﬂation forecasts8.T o
avoid overlapping forecast intervals and consequent problems with moving average
errors, we assume that the target horizon is one-quarter for both inﬂation and the
output gap (i.e., k = q =1 ). Following Clarida et al. (2000), we also assume that
two quarterly lags of it is suﬃcient to capture interest rate smoothing by the Fed and
to account for serial correlation.
8Ideally, we would also like to check robustness against actual output gap forecasts. Unfortunately,
although Greenbook forecasts of output growth are published, the corresponding output gap forecasts
are not. Orphanides (2001) reconstructs these output gap forecasts for the period 1987-1992, but
this is not a suﬃciently long time period for our purposes.
16Our speciﬁcations for inﬂation and the output gap follow Gerlach and Smets
(1999) and Aksoy et. al. (2002), so that for this purpose we assume that the functions
f(e yt) and g(rt) in (2.2) and (2.3) respectively are linear. We also do not impose the
u n i tr o o tf o ri n ﬂation implicitly assumed in the former. More precisely, we assume
that inﬂation is determined by the (CBO) output gap with a one period lag and past
inﬂation rates, yielding the estimated forecasting equation:














The output gap is assumed to depend on previous output gaps and the average real
interest rate over the year ending in the previous quarter. In the case of the CBO
measure, this estimated equation yields the one-step ahead forecast for the outut gap
as:




e yt−1 − 0.054
(0.119)
e yt−2 − 0.168
(0.076)
e yt−3 − 0.075
(0.029)
(rt−1 − πt−1) (4.5)
where rt and πt denote four-quarter (moving) averages of current and past interest
and inﬂation rates. The lag lengths of inﬂation and the output gap in (4.4) and
(4.5) respectively were chosen by AIC.9 Since our sample is similar to Clarida et al.
(2000), we use their estimates of the inﬂation target π∗, namely π∗ =4 .24 in the
pre-Volcker period (1960:I - 1979:II) and π∗ =3 .58 in the Volcker-Greenspan period
(1979:III - 2000:IV).10 One other word is relevant about timing. As already noted,
9The use of BIC did not qualitatively alter the results. When HP detrended output is used in
(4.5), the lag length by AIC is unchanged at three.
10Dolado et al. (2002b) and Bec et al. (2002) assume that the inﬂation target is time-varying and
use the index published in the reports of the Council of Economic Advisors as the inﬂation target
measures for the U.S. However, as in Clarida et al. (2000), we assume that the inﬂation target is
constant over the tenure of these FRB chairmen.
17we use interest rate data for the ﬁrst month of each quarter t, on the assumption
that this captures the reaction of the Fed to the most recent information (relating to
quarter t−1)a b o u ti n ﬂation and output. Therefore, following Clarida et al. (2000),
although we refer to a one-quarter ahead forecast with k = q =1in (4.3), this forecast
is for inﬂation and the output gap over the quarter t, since this is a whole quarter in
advance of the information available when the relevant interest rate decision is made.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 report the test statistic ν2 of (3.4) for the null hypoth-
esis of linearity in the forward-looking reaction function (4.3), computed separately
for whole sample and the two subsamples. Over the whole sample, there is eﬀectively
no evidence against a linear policy rule. However, using the CBO output gap data,
linearity is overwhelmingly rejected in the pre-Volcker era, but not in the Volcker-
Greenspan period. The distinct results for the two subperiods is compatible with
diﬀerent monetary policies being conducted pre- and post-1979, a ﬁnding in line with
Clarida et al. (2000) and other recent studies. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence of
nonlinearity in the later period contrasts with the results of some other studies of
this period, including Bec et al. (2002) and Dolado et al. (2002a), but agrees with
Dolado et al. (2002b). Using HP detrended output, the evidence of nonlinearity in
Table 1 for the pre-Volcker subsample is weaker than using the CBO measure, but
the test statistic is signiﬁcant at 10 percent. The other results using the HP ﬁlter
conﬁrm the ﬁndings obtained with CBO data.
Based on these results, we estimate a forward-looking nonlinear model for the ﬁrst
subperiod, but not for either the Volcker-Greenspan period or for the whole sample.
Bayesian posterior estimates and their standard errors are reported in columns two
and three of Table 2 for the parameters of (4.3) in the pre-Volcker subsample. When
the CBO output gap measure is used, the coeﬃcient on Ete πt+1 in the linear part is
not statistically signiﬁcant (indeed, this coeﬃcient is negative and close to zero), but
18the expected output gap and the interest rate of the previous quarter each linearly
exert a positive eﬀect on the interest rate. The nonlinear part m(g¯xt) is signiﬁcant
collectively (as evidenced by the t-statistic for ζ =0 ), with inﬂation individually hav-
i n gas i g n i ﬁcant positive nonlinear impact through b g1. When HP detrended output
is used, the nonlinear part overall is not statistically signiﬁcant at 10 percent, but
the general pattern of estimated coeﬃcients is similar to the CBO case.
To assist interpretation, we ﬁx values of one of inﬂation and the output gap at
its sample mean and examine the consequences for the estimated reaction functions
of changing the value of the other variable. This is achieved using the posterior
distribution whose mean and standard deviation for each parameter are reported in
the corresponding column of Table 2. Each value of the two variables gives a x∗ of
interest, with (3.6) used to compute the corresponding estimated conditional mean
b µ(x∗). By generating a range of estimates of µ(x∗), as explained in Section 3, 95
percent conﬁdence intervals are also computed. However, these conﬁdence regions
are often relatively broad at extreme values for the variables, where little sample
information is available, so that inferences on the shapes of these functions at the
extremes must be treated with some caution.
Initially we ﬁx Ete yt+1 at its sample mean while Ete πt+1 is allowed to vary, resulting
in Figures 1a and 1b for the CBO and HP ﬁltered output gap data respectively. In
both cases, but particularly using the CBO measure, the ﬁgure indicates a more
aggressive reaction by the Fed to expected inﬂation above than below the target.
Indeed, for inﬂation beyond about 0.5 percent under target, the slope in Figure 1a is
essentially ﬂat, implying the same reaction by the Fed to any value of inﬂation below
this threshold. When Ete yt+1 is varied, Figures 2a and 2b indicate a steeper slope in
reaction to a negative output gap than for a positive one, implying that prior to 1979
the Fed may have reacted more strongly to output below than above potential. This
19is compatible with the notion that the Federal Reserve was more concerned about
recession than expansion in the 1960s and 70s, as found by Gerlach (2000). Here the
use of HP detrended output (Figure 2b) shows a distinct kink in the reaction for a
negative output gap of around 0.8 percent, with a steeper slope to the left than to
the right.
In sum, in a forward-looking context, our investigation ﬁnds little evidence against
the hypothesis that the Fed operated a linear monetary policy rule when data over
the whole sample or post-1979 are used. However, we ﬁnd substantial support for
a nonlinear policy rule in the pre-Volcker period, with graphical evidence suggesting
that the Fed reacted more vigorously to expected inﬂation deviations above than
below the inﬂation target and more strongly to output below than above potential.
The latter is consistent with a recession aversion story in which policy makers care
more about falls than increases in output.
The next two subsections consider the robustness of our results. Firstly, we use
a backward-looking speciﬁcation which avoids the need to forecast inﬂation and the
output gap in Subsection 4.3, then we examine the robustness of our forward-looking
model results to diﬀerent inﬂation forecasts and to the dates used for the second
subsample in Subsection 4.4.
4.3 Backward-looking rule
Our ﬂexible nonlinear version of the backward-looking rule suggested by Taylor (1993)
corresponds to speciﬁcation (4.3) with both k and q set to 0. That is, the estimated
model has the form
it = c + απt + βe yt + γ1it−1 + γ2it−2 + σ[ζm(g1πt,g 2e yt)+vt], (4.6)
20where the subscript of t on inﬂation and the output gap correspond to the latest
information on these variables available in the ﬁrst month of quarter t.A si nT a y l o r
(1993), this equation is speciﬁed in terms of actual observed inﬂation and not the
past deviation from target. The backward-looking model has the advantage over
the forward-looking one that we do not need to specify the form of the forecasting
equations used by the Fed for inﬂation and the output gap, since such equations are
implicitly embedded in the nonlinear backward-looking model. Thus, nonlinear forms
of the AS and/or AD equations (2.2)/(2.3) could be the source of any nonlinearity
in (4.6).
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 1 report the results of Hamilton’s linearity test
applied to (4.6) for the whole sample and two subsamples. These are qualitatively
similar to those for the forward-looking rule. In particular, there is little evidence
against linearity for the whole sample or the Volcker-Greenspan subsample, but sig-
niﬁcant evidence for the earlier subsample. This evidence is especially strong when
using the CBO output gap measure, but now the HP detrended output data gives a
signiﬁcant test statistic at 5 percent and is close to signiﬁcance at 1 percent.
Bayesian posterior estimates and their standard errors for the backward-looking
ﬂexible nonlinear policy rule (4.6) are reported in the ﬁn a lt w oc o l u m n so fT a b l e2f o r
the pre-Volcker subsample. These are similar overall to those of the forward-looking
rule. However, the linear component relating to neither inﬂation nor the output gap
in the backward-looking case is signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on inﬂation is again very
small and negative. The estimated linear response of the Fed to the actual output gap
is less strong than that for the forecast value, with the coeﬃcient b β in (4.6) not being
statistically signiﬁcant at even 10 percent. On the other hand, the importance of
the overall nonlinear component in this backward-looking speciﬁcation is underlined
by the strong signiﬁcance of b ζ for both sets of estimates. The coeﬃcients of both
21inﬂation and the output gap individually are positive in the nonlinear component,
although the only signiﬁcant coeﬃc i e n th e r ei st h a to fi n ﬂation in the model using
the CBO output gap.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the estimated nonlinear functions b µ(.) for this backward-
looking case, using the same approach as in Figures 1 and 2. Once again, despite
the negative sign and lack of signiﬁcance of the linear inﬂation coeﬃcient, Figure 3a
(using CBO output gap) implies that the overall eﬀect of inﬂa t i o no nt h eF e d ’ sr e a c -
tion function is positive. However, there is little response from the Fed to observed
inﬂation (at an annual rate) of around 2 percent or less. Therafter, the response is
eﬀectively linear, until it ﬂattens oﬀ at approximately 9 percent. Nevertheless, since
the conﬁdence interval gets wider as the rate of inﬂation increases, the estimated
response at these higher rates is less reliable. The shape in Figure 3b, using HP
ﬁltered output, is similar, although the response ﬂattens oﬀ at around 5 (rather than
9) percent.
The response of the Fed to the output gap shown in Figure 4a for the CBO
output gap model is again positive overall. Although the shape is less smooth than
the corresponding forward-looking graph (Figure 2a), within the central range of ±2
percent it appears that the Fed reacts more aggressively to negative than positive
output gaps. Using HP detrended output leads to a smoother estimated response to
the output gap in Figure 4b. In particular, a kink can be seen at an output gap of a
little over 1 pecent, with a stronger estimated response by the Fed below this value
than above it.
In sum, there are no substantial diﬀerences between the estimates of the nonlinear
forward-looking policy rule and that of the nonlinear backward-looking rule. The
estimates in both cases suggest that the Fed reacted more strongly to output below
than above potential output in the 1960s and 70s, and that it did not respond to
22changes in inﬂation provided that the rate remained low.
4.4 Robustness of the forward-looking estimates
In the estimates of nonlinear forward-looking policy rule discussed above, we used in-
ﬂation forecasts generated by equation (4.4). Here, we consider alternative inﬂation
forecasts, speciﬁcally actual one-quarter ahead forecasts made in real time by the
Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Greenbook of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors. Table 3 reports the test statistic ν2 of the null hypothesis of linearity
for both inﬂation forecasts, when combined with our one-quarter ahead output gap
forecasts for the CBO series through equation (4.5). However, results are not pre-
sented for the pre-Volcker subsample here because neither forecast series is available
for the early part of this period. Nevertheless, we are able to investigate whether the
apparent linearity found for the whole sample and the Volvker-Greenspan period is
robust to the inﬂation forecast series.
The results using the inﬂation forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters
in Table 3 are in line with our results from Table 1, namely we do not reject linearity
over either the whole sample or for the Volcker-Greenspan subsample. However, one
potentially interesting ﬁnding is that the Greenbook forecasts yield a p− value that
is signiﬁcant at 5 percent for this subsample. Although we do not pursue it here, this
points to the potential value of further investigation into whether the use of these
inﬂation forecasts constructed within the Fed may shed light on possible nonlinearity
in the monetary policy rule over the Volcker-Greenspan period.
Since our second subsample includes the period when the Fed targeted nonbor-
rowed reserves rather than Federal Funds rates, and interest rates were high and
volatile, it is worth investigating whether this abnormal period has inﬂuenced the
overall results for the Volcker-Greenspan era. To do this, we exclude 1979:III-1982:IV,
23and repeat the linearity test. The results are included in Table 3. These conﬁrm the
lack of signiﬁcance of the nonlinearity at the conventional level for either the gen-
erated inﬂation forecasts or those of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and for
either output gap measure. However, as Greenbook data are available only to 1996IV,
the test is not conducted using this inﬂation forecast series over this shorter period.
Thus, our overall conclusion is that the Fed has reacted in an essentially linear
way to pin inﬂation down to its target in the Volcker-Greenspan period. This is in
contrast to the conclusion of Dolado et al. (2002a) that the Fed’s reaction since 1983
may have been asymmetric with respect to inﬂation. However, it agrees with Dolado
et al. (2002b) who ﬁnd that a nonlinear Phillips curve does not lead to asymmetries
in US monetary policy in this period. Also, although Bec et al. (2002) model an
asymmetric reaction to inﬂation for this period, their evidence is relatively weak and
signiﬁcant only at 3 percent.
4.5 Alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations
Our results provide strong evidence of a nonlinear policy rule in the pre-Volcker era.
To examine whether the parametric models reviewed in Section 2 adequately capture
this nonlinearity, we consider a formal statistical basis for comparing these alternative
speciﬁcations with the nonlinearity revealed by the data through the ﬂexible inference
procedure. Note that the proposed alternative speciﬁcations in equations (2.5), (2.6)
and (2.8), although nonlinear functions of the inﬂation deviation (or inﬂation) and
the output gap, are linear functions of the parameters and thus they can be described
as a linear regression model of the form
yt = α0 + α0zt + εt (4.7)
24for suitable speciﬁcations zt. For example, with two lags of interest rates, equation
(2.6) is a special case of (4.7) with zt =( it−1,i t−2,e πt+1, e yt,e πt+1e yt)0. As such, we
can test directly whether this particular speciﬁcation for zt adequately captures any
nonlinearity in the data by comparing (4.7) with the more general model
yt = α0 + α0zt + λm(xt)+εt (4.8)
for xt =( e πt+1, e yt)0 and m(.) a realization of the random ﬁeld whose correlations
are characterized by (3.2a)/(3.2b). A test of H0 : λ =0is now a test of whether
the deﬁnition of xt adequately captures the nonlinear dependence of yt on e πt+1, e yt.
This test is just adapted from testing the null hypothesis of linearity to testing the
null hypothesis that the nonlinearity takes a particular known parametric form. In
what follows, we consider four alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations for the forward-and
backward-looking rules. Table 4 summarizes them.
Models 1F and 1B are threshold type models in which the Fed is allowed to
react diﬀerently to positive and negative deviations of inﬂation from target and of
the output gap. Models 2F and 2B are versions of the business cycle dependent
model of Bec et al. (2002), and discussed as (2.5) above, where the Fed’s reaction
to the deviation of inﬂation from target and the output gap depends on the stage
of the business cycle. Models 3F and 3B are Dolado et al.’s (2002a) speciﬁcation in
which asymmetric preferences lead to prudent behaviour whereby the Fed responds to
the conditional variance of inﬂation; see (2.8). Following those authors, conditional
volatility in inﬂation is parameterized through a GARCH(1,1) model, here applied
to the residuals of our inﬂation forecasting equation (4.4). Finally, Models 4F and
4B are Dolado et al.’s (2002b) interaction model of inﬂation and the output gap,
considered above as equation (2.6).
25Table 5 reports the ν2 test statistics for these alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations
in the pre-Volcker era, using the CBO measure of the output gap. Given the very
limited evidence we have found of nonlinearity in the monetary policy function over
Volker-Greenspan period, we do not consider this later period. The nonlinearity
evidenced by the test statistics for the pre-Volcker period in Table 1 is eﬀectively
undiminished in both versions of Model 3, implying that the introduction of inﬂation
volatility does not account for this nonlinearity. We do not argue against the results
of Dolado et al. (2002a) that such volatility may play a signiﬁcant role in the Fed’s
monetary policy, but rather our conclusion is that it is not suﬃcient to characterize
the nonlinearity during this period. The threshold-type Models 1 and 2 are generally
more successful. Model 2F reduces the nonlinearity test statistic in the forward-
looking model from 13.5 in Table 1 to 4.22 in Table 5, with the latter having a
p−value of 0.04. Thus, business cycle dependence in the model of Bec et al. (2002)
may be part of the underlying source of the nonlinearity. Similarly, the backward-
looking Model 1B, which also includes a business cycle dependence, is reasonably
successful.
The most successful model overall, however, is the interaction model of inﬂation
with the output gap (Models 4F, 4B). In this case, the ν2 test statistic is not signif-
icant at any conventional level in the backward-looking speciﬁcation, and is at the
margin of signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level for the forward-looking version. There-
fore, this interaction apparently summarizes the nonlinearity in the monetary policy
rule adequately, especially in the backward-looking speciﬁcation.
This formal comparison suggests that the nature of nonlinearity in the monetary
policy rule prior to 1979 might result partly from asymmetric reactions by the Fed
to inﬂation deviations and (especially in the forward-looking case) the output gap,
but more importantly from the Fed’s reaction to the interaction between inﬂation
26and the output gap as in the model of Dolado et al. (2002b). As these authors point
out, the intuition behind this interaction is plausible. If inﬂation is above target, the
real interest rate will be below its equilibrium level, causing an increase in the output
gap next period through the AD relation (2.3). Since in their model the Phillips
curve (2.2) is convex, that anticipated future increase in the output gap will lead to
greater anticipated inﬂationary pressure than in the linear case. To oﬀset this latent
inﬂationary pressure, the Fed should increase the interest rate at t by more than
in the linear model. In line with Dolado et al. (2002b), our evidence above does
not ﬁnd nonlinearity of this type in the post-1979 period for the US. It is plausible
that the Fed might have placed much more weight on the inﬂation target than the
output gap during this recent period, and hence not reacted in a signiﬁcant way to
the interaction between these.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The linear monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993) has since been widely
used, including in the inﬂuential work of Clarida et al. (1998, 2000). However, this
has recently been challenged on two grounds. Firstly, the central bank may have
asymmetric responses to inﬂation deviations from target and/or to the output gap
and, secondly, the underlying Phillips curve may be convex. Pursuing these two
routes, contributors to the literature have speciﬁed sets of nonlinear relationships
b a s e do np a r a m e t r i cm o d e l sa n dp r o v i d e ds ome evidence in favor of nonlinearity
in the policy rule. Our view is that because neither the preferences of the central
bank nor the Phillips curve are directly observed, any inferences drawn from speciﬁc
parametrizations should be conﬁrmed against a ﬂexible nonlinear speciﬁcation. De-
tecting nonlinearity in a particular parametric form could otherwise lead to incorrect
27conclusions about the validity of the particular model.
The contribution of this paper is to address this question using the framework
of Hamilton (2001a) that explicitly parameterizes the set of nonlinear relations in a
ﬂexible way and takes into account uncertainty about the functional from in conduct-
ing hypothesis tests. We ﬁnd that while there is quite strong evidence that the Fed
operated a nonlinear monetary policy rule during the pre-Volcker period (1960-1979),
the evidence is generally weak in Volcker-Greenspan era. Our results are relatively
robust to whether the policy rule is forward- or backward looking, to output gap
measures and to whether generated or actual inﬂation forecasts are used.
We also examine particular parametric speciﬁcations proposed in recent work in
the context of the ﬂexible, unrestricted framework. The notion that the Fed reacted
more vigorously to inﬂation deviations above than below target and more strongly
to output below than above potential in the 1960s and 70s characterizes the nature
of the nonlinearity fairly successfully, but still leaves some unexplained nonlinearity.
More promisingly, the interaction between inﬂation and the output gap, speciﬁed
by Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2002b) as arising through a convex Phillips
curve, does rather well. Hence, we suggest that future structural models might build
on this work to allow interactions of the dynamics of inﬂation and the output gap to
inﬂuence the nonlinear monetary policy rule.
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32Table 1. Tests of the linearity null hypothesis µ(xt)=α0 + α0
1xt + α0
2zt
Sample Output gap Forward-looking rule Backward looking rule
(dates) measure Statistic p − value Statistic p − value
Whole sample CBO 0.603 0.438 0.036 0.849
(1960:I - 2000:IV) HP 1.409 0.235 0.0002 0.988
Pre-Volcker CBO 13.531 0.0002 12.25 0.0005
(1960:I - 1979:II) HP 3.451 0.063 6.12 0.013
Volcker-Greenspan CBO 0.499 0.480 0.507 0.476
(1979:III - 2000:IV) HP 1.829 0.176 1.834 0.176
Note: CBO and HP denote the output gap estimate of the Congress Budget Oﬃce
and Hodrick-Prescott detrended output respectively.
33Table 2 Bayesian estimates of the ﬂexible nonlinear policy rule in the pre-Volcker
subsample
Forward-looking rule Backward-looking rule
Equation (4.3) Equation (4.6)









































































Note: a) The values in parentheses are the standard errors of Bayesian posterior
estimates with N = 5000 Monte Carlo simulations. b) ***, ** and * denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in a two-tailed t−test.
34Table 3. Tests of the linearity null hypothesis µ(xt)=α0 + α0
1xt + α0
2zt:
Robustness analysis of the forward-looking model
Sample Inﬂation forecasts Output gap measure Statistic p − value
Whole sample SPF (68IV-00IV) CBO 0.074 0.785
Greenbook (65IV-96IV) CBO 2.333 0.127
Volcker-Greenspan SPF (79III-00IV) CBO 0.472 0.492
Greenbook (79III-96IV) CBO 4.944 0.026
1983I - 2000IV Own CBO 0.255 0.613
Own HP 0.374 0.541
SPF CBO 1.109 0.292
Note: SPF indicates the median one-quarter ahead forecasts of the Survey of
Professional Forecasters.
35Table 4. Alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations
Model Speciﬁcation
1F it = c + α1Ete πt+1 + α2Ete πt+1δ[Ete πt+1>0] + β1Ete yt+1 + β2Ete yt+1δ[e yt+1>0] + γit−1 + εt
2F it = c + α1Ete πt+1 + α2Ete πt+1δ[e yt−1>0] + β1Ete yt+1 + β2Ete yt+1δ[e yt−1>0] + γit−1 + εt
3F it = c + αEte πt+1 + βEte yt+1 + ωσ2
πt + γit−1 + εt
4F it = c + αEte πt+1 + βe yt + ψ(Ete πt+1e yt)+γit−1 + εt
1B it = c + α1πt + α2πtδ[πt>π∗] + β1e yt + β2e ytδ[e yt>0] + γit−1 + εt
2B it = c + α1πt + α2πtδ[e yt−1>0] + β1e yt + β2e ytδ[e yt−1>0] + γit−1 + εt
3B it = c + απt + βe yt + ωσ2
πt + γit−1 + εt
4B it = c + απt + βe yt + ψ(πte yt)+γit−1 + εt
Note: a) F and B denote forward- and backward-looking models, respectively. b)
δ[.] is unity if the statement [.] is true and 0 otherwise. c) π∗ =4 .24,t h ea s s u m e d
inﬂation target, as in Clarida et al. (2000).
36Table 5. Tests of the linearity null hypothesis µ(xt)=α0 + α0
1xt + α0
2zt for
alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations in the pre-Volcker period
Rule Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Stat. p − value Stat. p − value Stat. p − value Stat. p − value
F 9.77 0.002 4.22 0.040 12.35 0.0004 3.85 0.05
B 4.88 0.027 10.63 0.001 19.46 1.0e-05 0.98 0.32
Note. F and B denote forward and backward-looking models, respectively.
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